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WHEN A SHIP SAILS.
The risk assumed in underwriting a vessel necessarily varies
so much with the season of the year that the time of the vessel's sailing becomes an essential factor of the contract. It is
customary, therefore, to insert in the policy a warranty to
govern this matter, by restricting the vessel to sailing before
or after a specified date or during a certain part of the year.
The premiums can thus be proportioned to the chances of
loss. This warranty of the time of sailing has presented
many nice questions both of law and fact; indeed, within the
last few months a case was decided in England (Sea lnsuracopanjy v. Blogg, [I898,] i Q. B. 27), involving a careful
examination of the subject.
The rule is stated in various forms by the authorities:
" If a ship, warranted 'to sail' on or before a given day,
quits her moorings on or before the day limited, being then
perfectly ready to proceed on her sea voyage, and removes,
though only to a short distance, with the bona fide intention
of at once prosecuting such voyage, that is a sailing within
the meaning of the warranty, although she may subsequently
be detained till after the lim'.ited day by some unforeseen
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delay. If, on the other hand, the ship, at the time she quits
her moorings and sets sail, is not in a state of complete
preparation for her sea voyage, and is not bonafide intended
to proceed directly and immediately upon it, this is not a compliance with the warranty. In short, in order to satisfy a
general warranty to sail, there must be a bonafide commencement of the voyage insured on or before the given day :"
Arnould on Insurance, 61 o.
"A vessel has ' sailed' the moment she is unmoored and
got under way, in complete preparation for the voyage, with
the purpose of proceeding to sea without further delay at the
port of departure :" I Plzillips on Insurance, § 6io.
When the port of departure is inland, this author treats it as
including "any places that can be considered parts or branches
of, or appendages to, the port named, and auxiliary to its
navigation."
Joyce on Insurance does not formulate a rule, but quotes
from the cases cited herein.
The rule has been stated also in several decisions:
" To constitute a sailing under this warranty, the vessel at
the time of sailing must be, in the contemplation of the captain, at absolute and entire liberty to proceed to her port of delivery in a mathematical line if it were possible :" Per Lord
Mansfield, in Thellusson v. Staples, I Doug. 366n. (1780).
"It is clear that a warranty to sail, without the word from,
is not complied with by the vessel's raising her anchor, getting under sail and moving onwards, unless at the time of the
performance of these acts she has everything ready for the
performance of the voyage, and such acts are done as the
commencement of it, nothing remaining to be done afterwards :" Per Abbott C. J., in Lang v. Anderdon, 3 B. & C.
495 (1824). (Arnould on Insurance ascribes this erroneously
to Lord Tenterden.)
"The general principle of the decisions is this : That if a
ship quits her moorings and removes though only to a short
distance, being perfectly re'ady to proceed upon her voyage,
and is by some subsequent occurrence detained, that is,
nevertheless, a sailing; but it is, otherwise if. at the time when
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she quits her moorings and hoists her sails, she is not in a
condition for completing her sea voyage :" Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Pittegrew v. Pingle, 3 B. & Ad. 514 (183 2).
An analysis of the rule shows that three conditions must be
fulfilled:
I. The ship must be ready;
2. The ship must move forward;
3. The forward movement must be bonafide with the intention to proceed immediately on the voyage.
These will be examined in turn.
I. The requirement that the ship shall be ready for the
voyage has not always been applied with the same degree of
strictness., The English courts apparently interpret the rule
to mean that all the preparations must be complete for the'
whole voyage and not merely for the first part of it, unless
the voyage be distinctly severable; in this country, the preparations not immediately required have in some instances been
postponed without affecting the result. It is hardly sufficient,
therefore, to say that the ship must .be"sea-worthy; " that
term is " used and understood to state that the ship is in a
condition, in all respects, to render it reasonably safe where it
happens to be at any particular time referred to, whether in a
dock, in a harbor, in a river, or traversing the ocean:" Gibson
v. Small, L. R. 4 H. L. C. 417 (1853),pcr Lord Campbell; in
other words, it "expresses a relation between the state of the
ship and the perils it has to meet in the situation it is in:"
Id. per Erle, J. " Readiness," as defined in England, is not
a variable term in this way; it implies full preparation ab initio
for the voyage.
In Risdale v. Newnlham, 3 M. & S. 456 (I815), the policy
was on freights and goods per a ship at and from Portneuf to
London, warranted to sail on or before October 28th. The
ship was duly loaded at Portneuf, and on October 26th dropped
down the river about thirty miles to Quebec, with a crew
adequate for the purpose. At Quebec she obtained her clearance papers, which could not have been obtained at Portneuf,
and shipped a crew for the ocean voyage. A delay in
making out the papers detained her until after the 28th.
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Lord Ellenborough held that while the policy had undoubtedly
attached at Portneuf, it must be taken distributively. Dropping down the river without a full crew was only preparatory
and there was a breach of the warranty as the ship did not
sail on or before the day limited, having her clearances and
fully equipped for the voyage. This is the leading case in
England. A case similar in its facts is Forshaw v. Chiabert,
3 B. & B. 158 (1821), where a ship, whose proper complement
was ten men, sailed from Cuba for Liverpool with a crew of
ten, of whom eight were engaged for Liverpool and two for
Jamaica. She touched at Jamaica to replace the two men,
and was subsequently lost on her way to Liverpool. The
court held the ship was not seaworthy at the time of leaving
Cuba. This case will serve as an illustration of the rigor of
the rule governing seaworthiness, and the rule governing
readiness is as severe.
Pittegre-w v. PI-ngle, 3 B. & Ad. 514 (1832), has already
been cited. The warranty was that the ship should not sail
after thefirst of September. The depth of water on the harborbar prevented her going out with more than fifteen of the fifty
tons of ballast requisite for the voyage, so that the remaining
thirty-five tons were carried in lighters, to be shipped after
reaching deep water. She crossed the bar on the morning of
the 1st, intending to take the ballast aboard that day, but
struck heavily enough to require an examination to learn if
she were damaged. This caused a delay of several days in
another port. Lord Tenterden held it was not a "sailing "" if, at the time a ship quits her moorings and hoists her sails,
she is not in a condition for completing her sea voyage." It
was no answer that the ship could not have crossed the bar
with the ballast aboard, for, per Littledale, J., "it was the
plaintiff's business to put himself in such a situation as to be
sure of completing his ballast in the proper time." The other
point in the case-that by the terms of the policy "the time
of clearing at the custom house [is] to be deemed the time of
sailing, provided the ship is then ready for sea,"-is not material to the present discussion.
This case was relied on, two years later, in Grahamv. Barras,
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5 B. & Ad. 1o I (1834), where the ship was under charter
from Dublin to St. Andrews and was warranted in the policy
not to sail aftcr the first of September. She cleared on
August 3 ist. A full crew had been engaged but was not
actually on board either then or when she dropped down the
river from Dublin to the Pigeon Hole on September ist.
There she anchored during the afternofi and the- cew" came
aboard; she proceeded to sea at 3.30 A. M. the next day.
The facts, it will be noted, differ from those of Risdale v.
Ncwnham in that the ship had obtained her clearance papers
and engaged her crew before moving; the court, nevertheless,
held without hesitation that she had not sailed as warranted.
The policy contained a clause similar to that in Pittegrew v.
Pringle,providing for a constructive sailing as of the time of
clearing, but the court was of the opinion that it had not been
complied with, since the ship was not " then ready for sea."
These cases are thus stated at length, as they are the leading English authorities. They are cited in nearly all the
subsequent cases on the point, whether arising under a policy
of insurance or a charter-party, for the rule as to these is the
same: Thompson v. Gilespy, 5 E. & B. 209 (I855).
In this country, apparently, the preparation need extend
only to the immediate demand. Mr. Justice Story uses this
language in M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., I Pet. 170
(1828):--"There is no doubt, that every ship must, at the
commencement of the voyage insured, possess all the qualities
of seaworthiness, and be navigated by a competent master and
crew......The argument assumes, that the ship ought not
to have got under way, or proceeded into the offing, until the
master, and all the crew, necessary, not for that act, but for
the entire voyage, were on board..... .But we are far from
being satisfied that the law has interposed any such positive
rule, as the argument supposes. Seaworthiness in port, or for
temporary purposes, such as mere change of position in harbor,
or proceeding out of port, or lying in the offing, may be one
thing; and seaworthiness for a whole voyage, quite another.
...
. What is a competent crew for the voyage; at what
time such crew should be on board; what is proper pilot
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ground; what is the course and usage of trade in relation to
the master and crew being on board, when the ship breaks
ground for the voyage, are questions of fact, dependent upon
nautical testimony; and are incapable of being solved by a
court, without assuming to itself the province of a jury, and
judicially relying on its own skill in maritime affairs." It is
evident, too, from other parts of his opinion that he considered
the ship had sailed as soon as she broke ground for the
voyage..
A stronger case is Union Ins. Co. v. Tysen, 3 Hill (N. Y.),
I18 (1842). The policy read f atsea, but the court held that
being at sea or on a passage and sailing were synonymous.
The ship's preliminary clearances were made ready and a pilot
and full crew engaged; of these only a part of the crew were
taken aboard; when the ballast was aboard, she moved, before
the day limited, a few lengths down a canal in the city of
Rotterdam and anchored in the river to await a shift of wind.
There she was detained by the adverse wind, but the court
held she had sailed when she left her berth in the canal. "She
was indeed to take her papers, her imprisoned seamen, her
pilot, and a paper in exchange on arriving at Helvoetsluys
[at the mouth of the river] preparatory to entering the broad
sea. But all these were matters of course, and just as much
at the master's pleasure as weighing anchor or unfurling the
sails......That the vessel has moved on the prosecution of
the voyage, whether in the sea, or an arm of the sea, enables
us to say she is on her passage, and exposed to the perils of
such passage. This vessel had sailed."
When the voyage is clearly severable, there is no doubt
that the preparation required varies with the needs of the successive stages. Thus a voyage from Lyons to the Black Sea
includes the navigation of the Rhone to Marseilles and that of
the Mediterranean thence to the Black Sea. The conditions
of the river navigation are such that a ship fully equipped for
the sea cannot cross the shoals or go under the bridges. It
was held, therefore, in Bouillon v. Lupton, 15 C. B. n. s. 1 13
(1863), to be an implied term of a policy on a ship undertaking such a voyage, that her equipment shall be appropriate
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to each stage of the voyage, and that due time shall be allowed
at the end of each stage to prepare for the next. The ship
"sails," consequently, within the meaning of the warranty,
when she first proceeds on the voyage as a whole, and not
when she enters upon the stage requiring the greatest
preparation.
The present writer ventures ta-think "that the English rule
is often unduly harsh in its operation, and that it might well,
at times, be modified by analogy to the doctrine of Bouillon
v. Lupton. When clearance papers cannot be obtained where
the insurance attaches or ballast cannot be carried over the
harbor bar, no injustice would seem to result from considering the voyage begun with the first forward movement. If
the papers are not gotten or the ballast shipped with all rea-sonable promptness, the delay works a deviation and avoids
the insurance. The peril of crossing the bar forms part of the
risks assumed, and damage resulting from it, as in Pittegrew v.
Pringle, should not, apparently, result in avoiding a policy
which had already attached. This view has the support of
Judge Story's opinion in M'Lanahan v. Ins. Co., as the necessary result of his language. The great advantage of the
English rule is that it presents less room for dispute. The
ship is either ready for the voyage or she is not ready, and
this is, in general, a question easily determined. We must
remember, however, that often, as in Graham v. Barras, no
sensible delay or actual damage results from the temporary
lack of complete readiness, so that the breach of the warranty
is purely a technical defence.
II. The second requirement is that the ship shali move forward on her voyage. It is apparently immaterial how far she
moves, but as Alderson. B., points out in Cochrane v. Fisher,
2. C. & M. 581 (1834), " the distance may be important with
regard to the question of bona fides." This subject of the
bonafides will be considered at length under the head of Intention. The distinction appears to be that dropping down
the river, however far, to obtain papers or crew, or moving
about the port to load, will be regarded as only preparatory
to the voyage. Once all is ready, the least free advance, in-
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tended for such, constitutes a sailing, even if it be immediately
arrested.
The cases already cited illustrate this: In Pittegrew v.
Pringle and Graham v. Barras, the forward movement was
arrested before complete sea-readiness and was not resumed
in time; the ship moved five or six lengths in Union Insztance Co. v. Tysen, being sufficiently ready, and was held to
have sailed. Similarly, in Wood v. Smith, L. R. 5 P. C. 451
(1874), a ship which left her dock and anchored in the Mersey
to go out with the morning's tide was held to be proceeding
to sea at the time she left the dock; "the anchoring was not
a discontinuance of her progress to the sea, but an act proper
and reasonable to be done in the course of it." But the advance must be free. In Nelson v. Salvador, Mood. & Malk.
309 (1829), the ship was riding to two anchors when she was
ready to break ground on the day limited. One anchor was
weighed, some sails set, and the other anchor-chain hove in
about thirty fathoms. A heavy swell then came into the bay,
making the captain stay where he was until the day following,
lest he be wrecked in getting out. Lord Tenderden nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that there had been a
breach of the warranty, although the ship had advanced
thirty fathoms. Had the second anchor been weighed, or the
heaving on the chain been for the purpose of working the
ship forward so as to attempt a departure, it would seem
there must have been a recovery, as in Cochrane v. Fisher.
Arnould on Insitrance has thus stated the rule on the
authority of Lord Mansfield's opinion in Bond v. Nult, 2
Cowp. 607 (1777):
"If, however, the ship has broken ground on her sea
voyage, and once got fairly under sail for her place of destination on or before the day limited in the warranty, though
she may have gone ever so little way, and afterwards put back
from stress ofweather, or apprehension of an enemy in sight, or be
stopped by an embargo, or be in any way afterwards involuntarily detained, yet, as there was a beginning to sail on the
voyage insured on or before the day, the warranty will be held
to have been complied with."
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In Lang v. Anderdon, 3 B. & C. 495 (1824), the warranty
was to sailfrom Demerara by a certain day. (This warranty
is more stringent than to saW, as it imports actual departure.)
The ship on the day limited proceeded two miles down the
river to its mouth and two miles further towards a shoal lying
in her course. There she anchored until the tide served on
the following day. Apparently the captain must have known
he could go but four miles that day, yet the ship was held to
have sailedfrom Demerara, as she was clear of the port, and
afortiori she had sailed on her voyage. A stronger case is
Cochrane v. Fiser, 2. C. & M. 581 (1834); I C. M, & R.
809 (1835), already mentioned. The master warped his ship
down the stream a half-mile on August 15th, the day limited,
well knowing that the head-wind would prevent his going to
sea. The ship grounded and lay there until the next day,
when she was warped still further, and at last got away with
a favorable wind. No sails were set while the ship was being
warped. The court held that the case turned solely on the
master's intention, and that being shown on a new trial,
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground "that
the facts clearly showed that the ship was in the prosecution
of her voyage on the I5th of August, having on that day
made a movement, though in the river, for the purpose of
proceeding to sea, and over the sea, to North America."
Accordingly, in Seq Ins. Co. v. Blogg [I898], I Q. B. 27, the
court considered nothing but the question of intention, although the movement was only from the wharf out into the
stream to a position where there might be an advantage of a
few minutes in going to sea. Further progress was not possible at the time by reason of the harbor regulations.
Nelson v. Salvador is equally an authority to show that
mere readiness and intention, without more, will not constitute
a "sailing," although the ship's starting on the voyage be
prevented by a peril which would justify a recovery were
damage incurred througl, it or, similarly, if it be prevented by
an inevitable and extraordinary restraint, not excepted in the
policy: Hore v. WV/tzmore, 2 Cowp. 784 (1778). This conclusion would seem to be the necessary result of the cases
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heretofore cited ; several of them go expressly on the ground
that the ship actually moved forward, and the reasoning is
such as to indicate that the converse of the proposition then
considered must be true. Pili§,ps on Insurance, § 773, however,
treats the point as doubtful. It regards Nelson v. Salvador as
conflicting with the cases we shall discuss more at length under
the head of Intention, where the insurance was "at and from"
an island, with a warranty to sail by a given day. Such
policies, it has been held, give the right to go from port to
port, to trade, etc., before the earliest day on which the ship
may sail ; but the ship sails from the first port if she leaves it
in full readiness and only touches at the second port to join
convoy, etc. ; it is therefore immaterial, under the construction
put upon such policies, whether the vessel is detained at the
second port by an embargo or not, when she touches there,
for the voyage is treated as already begun. In other words,
it is one from the first port, via the second, to the terminus ad

quent. The present writer is consequently unable to agree
with Pilips on Insurance in considering this class of cases,
Lan, v. Anderdon and Cockrane v. Fisher as mutually inconsistent. The learned author thus states his conclusions fiom
these cases :
" The preceding cases will not, I think, all concur in any
one general proposition, and that which seems to come nearest
to reconciling them xxith each other is, that,
If the risk has previously commenced under the policy,
and the vessel is wholly ready to depart by the time warranted,
so far as the fitting out, loading, manning, and clearing out,
and all other preparations and preliminaries to the actual
departure, depending upon the assured, are fully completed,
and nothing hinders her sailing but some peril insured against
by the policy, or which, if it had occurred at any subsequent
stage of the voyage would not have discharged the underwriters, the warranty to sail is complied with, unless a different construction is expressly indicated by the policy. Some
of the preceding cases come distinctly within this proposition.
" But if the risk is to commence only at the sailing of the
ship, and the assured is responsible for, and the underwriter
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free from, all preceding risks, perils, and losses, then the
warranty is not complied with unless she actually sails within
the time warranted."
This, it is submitted with all respect to such an authority,
is to mis-construe the cases of the "at and from " type. At
the least, it over-looks Lord Mansfield's language in Bond v.
.fart:" It is a question of fact whether [the ship] sailed from
Jamaica before the first of August. There is no latitude, no
equity, no construction that can supply the place of that fact.
Certainly, if she had been detained at St. Anne's [her port of
lading] beyond that day, though by proper reasons-as for
necessary repairs, tempestuous weather, to avoid an enemy, etc.
-the insurance on the voyage home would have been at an
end."
III. The subject of Intention has necessarily been touched
upon in the preceding sections. An intention to sail, as has
"There is
been stated, is an essential element of "sailing."
no authority for the proposition that there could be a ' sailing,' as required by the policy, without a clear intention on
the part of the master to proceed directly on his voyage :"
Per Mathew, J., in Sea Insurance Compan , v. BloggS.
The only noteworthy authorities even apparently in conflict
with this are the definitions of Lord Tenterden in Pittegrc' v.
Pringc,and of Baron Parke in Roelandts v. Hay-r-isonz, 25 Eng.
L. & E. 470 (1854). Lord Tendcerden speaks of a vessel as
sailing " if she quits her moorings and removes only to a
short distance, being peqf'ct/i' ready to procced upon her
voyg-e." This language is evidently used with reference to
the facts of the case before the court. What was done by
the matster was with the admitted intent of sailing, but the
advance was small and the ship not yet ready for sea. The
learned judge, therefore, has not referred to a matter not in
issue, and the defendant's argument in Sea Inslurance 61). v.
Bhog, based upon thki definition is fallacious.
Baron Parke, similarly, was distinguishing between "' sailing'" and " final sailing," in reference to a ship lost on her way
out, when he said that " the sailing is determined to be that
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period of time when the vessel breaks ground, being at that
time fully fit for sea, having the cargo on board which she
intends to carry, with a competent crew, and having permission to leave by having the custom-house clearances on
board."
The intention must, of course, be bonafide, else there would
be a fraud on the warranty, but it does not follow that the
desire to comply with the warranty may not be a motive
uniting with a desire to get away. This appears most clearly
in Cochrane v. Fisher, where the desire to comply with the
warranty was so manifest and the circumstances of the case
so unusual that the reality of any other motive seemed to the
court very doubtful. A new trial was ordered for the jury to
pass upon the question, and recovery was permitted upon the
jury's finding that the captain in fact intended to place his
ship in a more advantageous position for departure, although
he knew that he could not actually get away at that time. Of
course, as Alderson, B., pointed out, the improvement in position is a test of the bonafides of the movement. This must
be the thought underlying Mathew, J.'s, language in Sea Insurance Co. v. Blogg, when he said that "any obstacle which
was foreseen, and which would cause delay in getting the
vessel to sea, would postpone the time of sailing until the obstacle was removed "-i. e., if there can be no real gain,
there can be no real intention to depart when the master
breaks ground as though for the voyage.
Some very interesting cases have arisen under policies " at
and from" an island, with a warranty to sail by a certain day.
As this form of insurance gives liberty to go from port to
port to trade or to wait for convoy before the time of sailing
(Cruikshank v. JaIIson, 2 Taunt. 301 (18o9) and cases infra),
the question was presented whether the captain had intended
to sail from the first port without doing more than touch for
some proper purpose, not further preparation, at the second.
Sometimes the second port was not in the direct course, which
led to a defence on the ground of deviation, as in Thellusson v.
Ferg-usson, Doug. 36o (178o), but this was not tenable. Lord
Mansfield's opinion on the main point was as follows in Bondv.
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Nutt: "We are satisfied that the voyage from Jamaica to
England began from St. Anne's. On sailing, the ship had no
object but to make the best of her way to England; she
touched at Bluefields only as being the safest way she could
take . . . The great distinction (and on which we found
our opinion) is, that she left St. Anne's for England, with her
cargo, papers, master, etc., on board, and did not sail to Bluefields as a distinct port. If she had gone there for any purpose independent of the immediate prosecution of her voyage
-as for instance, to take in water, letters, or even to wait for
convoy, none being there-that would have made a great difference. There would then have been a coasting voyage to
Bluefields, and another from thence to England."
The question came up in various forms from time to time;
in Earle v. Harris, Doug. 357 (1780), the master went to
Bluefields for convoy, knowing an embargo had been announced but believing it would be raised and the convoy
allowed to sail that day; in Thellusson v. Fergisson and
Thellusson v. Staples, Doug. 366 n. (780), (actions on the
same policy) the ship was held at Basseterre by a special
order of the Governor, having touched there to join convoy
and also, as required by her clearance papers, to get the
Governor's despatches; in Wrig-lit v. Shffner, I I East, 5 15
(I 8O9), the policy was "from Surinam and all or any of the
West India Islands," and the ship sailed from Surinam before
the day limited, but touched after it at one of the West India
Islands to join convoy; the court in all these cases looked to
the master's intention to determine the real date of sailing.
The master must of course adhere to his original intention,
else it cannot avail him. Thus, in Vezian v. Grant, I Marsh.
on Ins. 353 (1779), the ship was insured at and from Martinique to Havre with leave to touch at Guadaloupe, "warranted
to sail after January 12th." She went to Guadaloupe before
January 12th, intending to return, but finding there a full cargo,
she proceeded to Havre. Had she returned, her departure on
the intermediate voyage to Guadaloupe would not have been
held a sailing for Havre, but her failure to return converted it
into such a sailing and avoided the policy.
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There seem to be comparatively few cases in this country
on the subject of a ship's sailing. M'Lanahan v. Universal
Insurance Co. and Union Insurance Co. v. Tysen have already
been cited.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held, in Dickey
v. Baltimore Insurance CO., 7 Cr. 327 (1813), on the authority
of Bond v. Nritt and Thellusson v. Staples. that a policy "at and
from" an island gives leave to trade from port to port before
the day of sailing, and the opinion of Marshall, C. J., makes it
clear that the rule as to the port of sailing would be followed
also.
Of the other cases, Dennis v. Ludlow, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
I II (1804), is one of the strongest. It appeared there that
the ship dropped down the stream in readiness for sea and
then waited sixteen days for the captain to recover fully from
a fever. Kent, C. J., held the ship had not sailed when she
left the port, as the captain did not intend to go to sea at that
time. Bowen v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 20 Pick. 275
(1838), is the converse of this and is to the same effect.
That the ship's sailing should thus depend on the master's
intention is clearly necessary, yet it is at the same time unfortunate. The question arises usually when the ship is lost and
then the most important witness is often lost as well; in any
event it makes a question, perhaps involving considerable
sums of money, turn largely on the credibility of a witness
deeply interested in the result. The burden of proof is of
course on the insured to show quo animo the ship sailed before
the days limited. The conditions, the clearances, etc., would
all be corroborating circumstances, tending to throw light on
the matter, but the master's own testimony may be the only
direct evidence on the subject.
IV. It remains to consider such expressions as "to depart"
and "to sail from." The first decided case appears to be
Moir v. Royal Exchang-e Assurancc Co., 3 M. & S. 461
(1815), in the Court of King's Bench. The counsel for the
defendant stated (6 Taunt. 243) that this company had changed
the form of its policy, to avoid the construction put upon the
word " sail." The new phrase was first before the court in
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1787, when the plaintiff was non-suited on the merits without
a consideration of this point. The plaintiff in Moir v. Co.
proved that the ship had sailed but had been stopped by a
change of wind on her way out of the harbor and detained
beyond the day limited within the harbor's mouth. Lord
Ellenborough non-suited him, holding the warranty meant
the ship should be out of the port A new action was then
brought in the Common Pleas, and the argument made that
the word " depart," in connection with the words " at and
from Memel " must refer to "at Memel." Therefore as soon
as the ship leaves the caput porus, the warranty is complied
with and the relative term "depart" becomes equivalent to
the absolute term " sail," in its effect. This did not prevail.
The court followed the ruling of tne Court of King's Bench,
Gibbs, C. J., saying, "To sail is to sail on the voyage. To
depart must be to depart from some particular place.
It cannot mean a departure from the town of Memel. I see
not then what it can mean except a departure from the port of
Memel."

(6 Taunt. 243.)

In England, this rule is undoubted, but it is not construed
with the same strictness in this country. For instance, the
policy in Nc/son v. Sun Jlutual Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. 453
(1877), was on " port-risk, in port of New York." The ship
cleared and left her pier, in tow, ready for sea. She was
injured after going but a short distance. The expert testimony was to the effect that the phrase " port-risk

"

. meant a

risk upon a vessel while lying in port, and before she had
taken her departure on another voyage." Upon this, the
court held this ship " had taken her departure and begun her
voyage." There is apparently a confusion of terms; the
authorities referred to by the defendant (the court cites none)
indicate that "sailing " was intended.

The words" sail from " are probably equivalent to " depart,"
as was argued in Lang v. Anderdon, 3 B. & C. 495 (1824).
The policy was " at and from Demerara," with warranty " to
sail from Demerara" by the first of August. The difficulty
in the case arose from the fact that the town of Demerara is in
the province of the same name and that a shoal outside the

WHEN A SHIP SAILS.

river's mouth prevents large vessels from entering the river.
The ship dropped down the river from the town in complete
readiness on August ist, but anchored over night within the
shoal. As many vessels load outside the shoal, the contention was made that the ship had not sailedfrom Demerara in
time. The court discussed the effect of the ship's ability to
cross the shoal fully laden and based the decision on the
ground that whatever might be the case with a ship of greater
draft, this one was away from Demerara on August ist on
her voyage. This case is the converse of .foir v. Royal
Exchange Assurance Co., and the two have established an
authoritative rule on the subject. The earlier case of Thellusson v. Feigusson, II. Doug. 369 (1777), cannot be given
any weight on this point. The warranty was to sail from
Grcnada by the ist of August.
Lord Mansfield thus
refers to the case in his opinion in Bond v. Nuti:
" On the first of August she had just got under sail (having
all her cargo and clearances on board), when an embargo was
laid on and the captain told he would be fired upon from the
fort if he proceeded. He therefore stopped and was detained
beyond the day. I held this to be a departure."
The case, it will be seen, was tried before the argument in
Bond v. Nutt, when the rule had as yet received little consideration. No distinction had then been suggested between
"sail from" or " depart," so that Lord Mansfield's languIgC

has become inaccurate only through the latter decisions.
As a result of this review of the authorities, we have seen
that the question of when a ship sails is dealt with by the
Common Law alone. The cases on the subject have been
decided by some of the most eminent of English judges, and
most of the leading cases within a period of a very few years.
In consequence, perhaps, of this, the development of the rules
has been unusually symmetrical and complete.
Erskine HazardDickson.

